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STANDARD OF CARE IN MALPRACTICE
ACTIONS AGAINST INSURANCE DEFENSE
COUNSEL: INAPPLICABILITY OF THE
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
INTRODUCTION
The Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR or Code),' which has
been adopted in some form by every state,2 is the authoritative guide-
line for ethical conduct of attorneys. In its Preliminary Statement, the
Code asserts that it does not "undertake to define standards for civil
liability of lawyers for professional conduct."' 3 Similarly, the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) 4 expressly provides that
its standards should not be implemented as a measure of civil liabil-
ity.5 Despite these admonishments against use outside the disciplinary
arena, courts have increasingly applied Code provisions, particularly
those relating to conflicts of interest, in legal malpractice actions, 6 and
1. Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1980) [hereinafter cited as Code].
2. R. Wise, Legal Ethics xv (Supp. 1979); Kramer, The Appearance of Inpro-
priety Under Canon 9: A Study of the Federal Judicial Process Applied to Lawyers,
65 Minn. L. Rev. 243, 246 (1980).
3. Code, supra note 1, Preliminary Statement.
4. Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Final Draft 1982), reprinted in 68
A.B.A. J. Pullout Supp. (1982) [hereinafter cited as Model Rules].
5. Model Rules, supra note 4, Scope. The drafters of the Model Rules have only
recently adopted the view that ethical standards should not be implemented in civil
liability actions. Earlier drafts took the position that although violations of the Model
Rules "should not necessarily result in civil liaiblity," they do have "relevance" in
civil actions. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Scope (Proposed Final Draft
1981), reprinted in 67 A.B.A. J. Pullout Supp. (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981
Model Rules].
6. E.g., Nolan v. Foreman, 665 F.2d 738, 743 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding
that breach of the Code states cause of action for legal malpractice); Woodruff v.
Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 936 (6th Cir.) (CPR standards implemented as evidence of
malpractice), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Kinnamon v. Staitman & Snyder, 66
Cal. App. 3d 893, 900-03, 136 Cal. Rptr. 321, 326 (1977) (Hanson, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that the majority had used the Code as legal basis of cause of action for
malpractice); Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 149, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 415
(1968) (attorney standard of care governed by standards of professional ethics);
Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 526 n.3, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 596 n.3
(1966) (using violation of ethics standards to define cause of action for legal malprac-
tice); Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 74 Ill. App. 3d 467, 473,
392 N.E.2d 1365, 1371 (1979) (using Code as the basis for evaluating malpractice
liability), aff'd, 81 Ill. 2d 201, 407 N.E.2d 47 (1980); Lipton v. Boesky, 110 Mich.
App. 589, 598, 313 N.W.2d 163, 167 (1981) (using Code violations as rebuttable
evidence of malpractice); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Holt, 36 N.C. App. 284, 292, 244
S.E.2d 177, 182 (1978) (relying on Code to dismiss malpractice action); Citizens
State Bank v. Shapiro, 575 S.W.2d 375, 386 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (assuming
without deciding that Code violation stated cause of action for legal malpractice);
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"violations of the Code are frequently treated as evidence of negli-
gence or negligence per se." ' 7 This practice has become so common
that CPR use in malpractice actions has been recognized as the "ma-
jority view." 8
Use of the CPR's directives on conflicts of interest to impose civil
liability is of particular concern to the insurance defense bar., The
potential for conflicts of interest is inherent in the tripartite relation-
ship, formed by the typical insurance contract, among defense coun-
sel, insurer and insured.' 0 These contracts generally give the insurer
the right and the duty to defend suits against the insured. The carrier
retains the power to choose counsel' 2 and "control" the defense
Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 94-98, 538 P.2d 1238, 1249-51 (1975) (CPR
relevant in defining attorney's duties); cf. In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig.,
93 F.R.D. 485, 490-91 (D. Md. 1982) (using Code to justify dismissal of class action
suit); Cambron v. Canal Ins. Co., 246 Ga. 147, 151-52, 269 S.E.2d 426, 430 (1980)
(using Code as part of jury instruction in civil litigation); Haynes v. First Nat'l State
Bank, 87 N.J. 163, 184, 432 A.2d 890, 901 (1981) (using Code to invalidate a will).
7. Dahlquist, The Code of Professional Responsibility and Civil Damage
Actions Against Attorneys, 9 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 1, 2 (1982).
8. Johnston, Attorney Accountability in Kentucky-Liability to Clients and
Third Parties, 70 Ky. L.J. 747, 768-69 (1982); see Underwood, The Doctor and His
Lawyer: Conflicts of Interest, 30 U. Kan. L. Rev. 385, 388 (1982): Developments in
the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1244, 1489-
90 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Conflicts of Interest]; 14 J. Mar. L. Rev. 589, 592
(1981); see also R. Mallen & V. Levit, Legal Malpractice § 256 (2d ed. 1981) (ver
,
common).
9. See Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. 865, 872 (W.D. Wis.
1977); R. Mallen & V. Levit, supra note 8, § 523, at 623; Underwood, supra note 8,
at 389; 69 Ill. B.J. 508, 510-11 & n.16 (1981). See generally Stern, Dilenmas for
Insurance Counsel-Coping with Conflicts of Interest, 65 Mass. L. Rev. 127 (1980)
(discussing difficult ethical problems defense counsel face regularly).
10. Longo v. American Policyholders' Ins. Co., 181 N.J. Super. 87, 91, 436 A.2d
577, 579 (Law Div. 1981). In some situations it may be difficult to recognize that a
conflict exists. See R. Mallen & V. Levit, supra note 8, § 530, at 640-41: Underwood,
supra note 8, at 385. In others a subtle conflict may be an accepted part of the
practice. See Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 Harv.
L. Rev. 1136, 1168 (1954); Morris, Conflicts of Interest in Defending Under Liability
Insurance Policies: A Proposed Solution, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 457, 459-61. As one court
recognized: "There is an inescapable tension for a lawyer, subject to ethical com-
mands far more stringent than those of the insurance marketplace, who must be
faithful to the interests of the insurer-client in control of the defense, and must also
,represent the insured as his client with undivided fidelity.' " Moritz v. Medical
Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. 865, 872 (W.D. Wis. 1977) (quoting ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 282 (1950)).
11. E.g., R. Keeton, Basic Text on Insurance Law 658 app. G (1971) (General
Liability-Automotive Policy); P. Magarick, Excess Liability 348 app. I (2d ed.
1982) (Basic Automobile Liability Policy); see Sargent v. Johnson, 551 F.2d 221, 230
n.12 (8th Cir. 1977); Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. 865, 871-72
(W.D. Wis. 1977).
12. Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. 865, 871-72 (W.D. Wis.
1977): Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 870, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511, 519
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through the right to defend or settle a liability suit as it deems expedi-
ent.' 3 Defense counsel's simultaneous duties of loyalty to the insurer
and the insured do not conflict when the interests of all parties coin-
cide. 14 Conflicts may arise, however, in suits in which the insured
faces liability in excess of his coverage,15 or when the insured wishes to
proceed to trial despite the insurer's desire to limit its liability through
settlement. ' 6
When an insured is sued for an amount in excess of his coverage, he
may fear excess judgment and consequent personal liability and thus
demand settlement for the policy limits regardless of the circum-
stances. '7 The insurance company, on the other hand, may not believe
that payment of all or part of the policy is warranted, and may wish
to proceed to trial.' Defense counsel, with duties of loyalty running to
each party, is caught in the middle.
(1973); American Home Assurance Co. v. Weissman, 79 A.D.2d 923, 925, 434
N.Y.S.2d 410, 412 (1981); P. Magarick, supra note 11, § 3.06, at 52; see R. Mallen &
V. Levit, supra note 8, § 522, at 621; Morris, supra note 10, at 465 & n.25.
13. Eureka Inv. Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 530 F. Supp. 1110, 1117
(D.D.C. 1982); Griggs v. Bertram, 88 N.J. 347, 360, 443 A.2d 163, 169 (1982); R.
Keeton, supra note 11, at 658; see Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc.,
608 P.2d 281, 284 n.1 (Alaska 1980).
14. Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 146, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 413 (1968);
Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 74 Ill. App. 3d 467, 473, 392
N.E.2d 1365, 1371 (1979), aff'd, 81 Ill. 2d 201, 407 N.E.2d 47 (1980); Weithers, The
Coverage Role of Defense Counsel, 48 Ins. Cons. J. 156, 156 (1981).
15. Longo v. American Policyholders' Ins. Co., 181 N.J. Super. 87, 92, 436 A.2d
577, 580 (Law Div. 1981); Alleman, The Reasonable Thing To Do: The Insurer's
Duty to Settle Claims Against Its Insured, 50 UMKC L. Rev. 251, 252 (1982);
Keeton, supra note 10, at 1136; Morris, supra note 10, at 466-67; Weithers, supra
note 14, at 157.
16. Lieberman v. Employers Ins., 84 N.J. 325, 340, 419 A.2d 417, 425 (1980); P.
Magarick, supra note 11, § 3.02, at 46-47; Alsobrook, Conflicts Between the Insurer
and Insured, 48 Ins. Couns. J. 165, 166 (1981).
17. R. Mallen & V. Levit, supra note 8, § 539, at 661-62; Comment, An Insurer's
Failure to Settle: Standing Under the Stowers Doctrine, Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, and Article 21.21 of The Insurance Code, 34 Baylor L. Rev. 441, 456
(1982) [hereinafter cited as An Insurer's Failure]; see Gallagher & German, Resolu-
tion of Settlement Conflicts Among Insureds, Primary Insurers, and Excess Insurers:
Analysis of the Current State of the Law and Suggested Guidelinesfor the Future, 61
Neb. L. Rev. 284, 289 (1982).
18. The contractual right of the insurance company to choose trial over settle-
ment has been tempered by the "universally accepted" cause of action for bad faith in
settlement negotiations. Note, Insurance Settlements: An Insured's Bad Faith, 31
Drake L. Rev. 877, 877 (1982) (discussing the duty of both the insurer and insured to
act in good faith in settlement negotiations) [hereinafter cited as Insured's Bad
Faith]. The insurer that disregards the interests of the policyholder in declining to
accept a reasonable settlement offer may find itself liable to the insured (or his
assignee) in the event of a jury verdict in excess of policy limits. E.g., Feliciano v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 646 F.2d 695, 697-98 (1st Cir. 1981); Hayes Bros. v.
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The concerns of the policyholder and the carrier may be reversed in
a professional liability suit' 9 in which the insurer is typically pre-
cluded from making settlement without the consent of the insured. 20
The policyholder may wish to go to trial to clear his name and avoid
increased premiums. 2' The insurer, however, may believe that valid
consent has been obtained or that an exception to the policy exists22
and wish to seize the opportunity, through settlement, to substantially
mitigate its potential liability. Again, defense counsel's duties of loy-
alty are put in tension. 23
The CPR was not drafted to address the unique predicament of the
insurance defense bar. Continued excessive reliance on the Code will
place insurance counsel in a difficult position in deciding whether
Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 634 F.2d 1119, 1122-23 (8th Cir. 1980): Offshore
Logistics Servs., Inc. v. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 469 F. Supp. 1099,
1103-04 (E.D. La. 1979), modified and affirmed, 639 F.2d 1142 (1981), Knobloch v.
Royal Globe Ins. Co., 38 N.Y.2d 471, 479-80, 381 N.Y.S.2d 433, 437-38, 344 N.E.2d
364, 369-70 (1976). For comprehensive analyses of the bad faith situation, see P.
Magarick, supra note 11, chs. 10-12; Allen, Insurance Bad Faith Law: The Need for
Legislative Intervention, 13 Pac. L.J. 833 (1982); Annual Survey of South Carolina
Law (Jan. 1-Dec. 31, 1979), 32 S.C.L. Rev. 1 (1980) (Business Law Section),
Comment, Insurers' Liability for Excess Judgments in Virginia: Negligence or Bad
Faith?, 15 U. Rich. L. Rev. 153 (1980); Note, The Availability of Excess Damages for
Wrongful Refusal to Honor First Party Insurance Claims-An Emerging Trend, 45
Fordham L. Rev. 164 (1976); Note, Insurers'Bad Faith: A New Tortfor Kansas?, 19
Washburn L.J. 467 (1980).
19. 33 Rutgers L. Rev. 1199, 1202-03 (1981); see Insured's Bad Faith, supra note
18, at 878 (hypothetical example).
20. E.g., The St. Paul Liability Policy (Lawyers' Professional Liability Coverage
Form), reprinted in R. Mallen & V. Levit, supra note 8, at 605 app. (1st ed. 1977):
Evanston Ins. Co., Lawyers Professional Liability Insurance Policy, reprinted in D.
Meiselman, Attorney Malpractice: Law and Procedure § 21.7, at 329, 335 (1980).
21. See Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 74 Ill. App. 3d
467, 476, 392 N.E.2d 1365, 1373 (1979), aff'd, 81111. 2d 201, 407 N.E.2d 47 (1980);
Lieberman v. Employers Ins., 84 N.J. 325, 341, 419 A.2d 417, 425 (1980); Aquilina
v. O'Connor, 59 A.D.2d 454, 456, 399 N.Y.S.2d 919, 920 (1977).
22. For an example of consent, see Lieberman v. Employers Ins., 84 N.J. 325,
331, 419 A.2d 417, 420 (1980). For an example of an exception, see Rogers v. Robson,
Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 74 Ill. App. 3d 467, 470-71, 392 N.E.2d 1365,
1369-70 (1979), aff'd, 81 Ill. 2d 201, 407 N.E.2d 47 (1980).
23. A third common area of conflict in which the carrier's interests are brought
in direct conflict with those of the insured are underlying coverage disputes. J.
Kircher & J. Quinn, Insurer's Duty to Defend-An Overview 24-27 (DRI Mono-
graph No. 3, 1978); Fager, Insured's Right to Independent Counsel In Conflicts of
Interest Situations, 48 Ins. Couns. J. 160, 160-61 (1981). Generally the defense
attorney should not involve himself in these coverage disputes because the conflicts of
interest are so pronounced. Bianchesi, Coverage Disputes with the Insured; The
Insurer's Perspective, 48 Ins. Couns. J. 153, 153 (1981); Weithers, supra note 14, at
156-57. Consequently, this Note does not discuss such conflicts.
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they may continue or even accept employment.2 4 And as their ability
to pursue their unique practice 25 is threatened, insurance rates may be
expected to skyrocket because two attorneys may be needed to per-
form a task handled presently by one. 26
Part I of this Note demonstrates how excessive reliance on the Code
to impose civil liability on insurance defense counsel suffers from
inflexibility and vagueness, and provides plaintiffs' counsel with a
weapon to force defense counsel into a precarious position. It also
demonstrates that the standard of care resulting from excessive Code
use-a standard of singular loyalty-raises more problems than it
would solve. Part II analyzes the traditional malpractice theory of
professional negligence and contends that its standard of care, based
on reasonableness in light of all relevant circumstances, is the only
viable standard by which the performance of insurance defense coun-
sel may be measured.2 7
I. INAPPLICABILITY OF THE CODE
Canon 5 of the CPR contains general prohibitions against the repre-
sentation of clients with conflicting interests. 28 Its only direct, albeit
unhelpful, reference to the insurance bar is in Ethical Consideration
(EC) 5-17, in which the insurer-insured relationship is mentioned as a
"recurring [situation] involving potentially differing interests. '29
24. See Guy, Insurance Counsel: Liability Still Requires Negligence, 23 For The
Def., Apr. 1981, at 10, 18 (noting that defense counsel may be involved in potential
conflict in all cases, and therefore faces possible liability). See supra text accompany-
ing notes 14-22.
25. R. Mallen & V. Levit, supra note 8, § 522, at 620; Dondanville, Defense
Counsel Beware: The Perils of Conflicts of Interest, 18 Forum 62, 62 (1982);
Weithers, supra note 14, at 156.
26. See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
27. It may be argued that the same arguments against Code use in malpractice
actions against insurance defense counsel, see infra notes 36-87 and accompanying
text, apply equally to use in disciplinary proceedings against such counsel. If this is
so, the traditional reasonableness standard, see infra notes 109-25 and accompanying
text, might also be more appropriate than Code standards in disciplinary proceedings
against insurance counsel. This Note, however, addresses only Code use in malprac-
tice actions.
28. Code, supra note 1, Canon 5 ("A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent
Professional Judgement on Behalf of a Client.").
29. Code, supra note 1, EC 5-17. The American Bar Foundation's Annotated
Code of Professional Responsibility (1979) [hereinafter cited as Annotated Code],
however, describes the representation of insurers and insureds as "[a]n unresolved
area of conflict [for which, in] the Code itself, no specific guidance is offered to the
attorney." Id. at 233. In Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. 865 (W.D.
Wis. 1977), the court remarked that "[t]he law and the canons of ethics defining and
governing [the tripartite] relationship are surprisingly unclear." Id. at 872. One
author, in discussing the plight of the defense attorney, noted recently that "the Code
1321
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Counsel faced with a conflict of interests is directed by Disciplinary
Rule (DR) 5-10530 to take one of three actions: (A) decline employ-
ment; 31 (B) withdraw from employment; 32 or (C) continue represen-
tation if it is obvious that adequate representation of each client may
be ensured after full disclosure and client consent. 33 Courts that treat
CPR violations as tantamount to negligence per se often rationalize
this practice by reasoning that the Code embodies or is strong evi-
dence of the common-law duties owed by an attorney to his client. 34
provides little guidance to assist an attorney in identifying specific conflicts peculiar
to insurance defense litigation .... The Code also provides no guidelines for assess-
ing the consequences that might flow from a given conflict." Underwood, supra note
8, at 389. Another contemporary commentator posits that "[t]he search for clear
standards in legal ethics is a nightmare worthy of the most horrifying Kafka novel."
Aultman, Legal Fiction Becomes Legal Fantasy, 7 J. Legal Prof. 31, 34 (1982).
Accordingly, there is great difficulty in applying the general precepts of the Code to a
specific factual situation.
30. Code, supra note 1, DR 5-105.
31. Id. DR 5-105(A).
32. Id. DR 5-105(B).
33. Id. DR 5-105(C). DR 5-105(A)-(C) provides:
Refusing to Accept or Continue Employment if the Interests of Another
Client May Impair the Independent Professional Judgment of the Lawyer.
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his
independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to
be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, or if
it would be likely to involve him in representing differing interests, except to
the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his
independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to
be adversely affected by his representation of another client, or if it would
be likely to involve him in representing differing interests, except to the
extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(C) In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may repre-
sent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the
interest of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclo-
sure of the possible effect of such respresentation on the exercise of his
independent professional judgment on behalf of each.
34. Lipton v. Boesky, 110 Mich. App. 589, 597-98, 313 N.W.2d 163, 166-67
(1981); Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 94-95, 538 P.2d 1238, 1249-50
(1975); R. Mallen & V. Levit, supra note 8, § 122, at 214; Dahlquist, supra note 7, at
2; Underwood, supra note 8, at 388; Conflicts of Interest, supra note 8, at 1489; see
Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 936 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980);
Kinnamon v. Staitman & Snyder, 66 Cal. App. 3d 893, 896-97, 136 Cal. Rptr. 321,
323-24 (1977); Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 149, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 415
(1968); Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 74 III. App. 3d 467,
472-73, 392 N.E.2d 1365, 1371 (1979), aff'd, 81 Ill. 2d 201, 407 N.E.2d 47 (1980).
Contra Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902, 907 (Iowa 1978) (Code not a basis for
private action); Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 220 Va. 1080, 1085, 266 S.E.2d 108, 112 (1980)
(same). A second rationale, drawing an analogy between Code implementation and
the accepted use of criminal or regulatory statutes in negligence litigation, has also
been recognized in malpractice litigation. Lipton v. Boesky, 110 Mich. App. 589,
597, 313 N.W.2d 163, 166 (1981); Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibility
1322 [Vol. 51
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These courts ignore three persuasive arguments against Code use out-
side the disciplinary context, and particularly in insurance defense
malpractice actions: 35 the Code's inflexibility, its vagueness and its
potential use as a weapon. Additionally, these courts fail to consider
the ultimate consequence of Code use-the imposition of a standard
of singular loyalty-and its potential effect on insurance practice.
A. Arguments Against Code Use
1. Inflexibility
Because DR 5-105(A) and (B) require counsel to withdraw or de-
cline employment in conflict of interest situations, 36 to adopt these
sections as establishing a standard of care would remove the discre-
tionary element necessary for counsel to function in the insurance
setting. 37 Insurance lawyers would be forced to choose between de-
clining employment and continually facing malpractice exposure be-
as a Measure of Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C.L. Rev. 281, 286
(1979); Conflicts! of Interest, supra note 8, at 1489. But see Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc.
v. Roloff, 630 P.2d 840, 844-47 (Or. 1981) (rejecting statute analogy). Although a
majority of courts do not currently recognize a cause of action for Code violations
alone, Dalhquist, supra note 7, at 2, such use of the CPR has gained increased
acceptance, id.; Johnston, supra note 8, at 768-69.
35. Commentators have acknowledged 4 general arguments against Code use in
civil litigation: 1) Total expansion of the CPR, where all violations serve as negli-
gence per se, would lead to a "floodgate" of litigation, Dahlquist, supra note 7, at 16,
and all claims phrased in the language of Code infractions, meritorious or not, would
survive motions to dismiss and threaten to bog down an already overburdened court
system. Id.; Wolfram, supra note 34, at 295; 2) Because the burden of proof in
disciplinary hearings, "clear and convincing evidence," 30 De Paul L. Rev. 499, 501
(1981), differs in degree from the burden in civil actions, "preponderance of the
evidence," Dahlquist, supra note 7, at 19 n.117, rules designed for one may not be
applicable to the other, see id. at 19; 30 De Paul L. Rev. 499, 501 (1981), and proof
that may not satisfy the burden at a disciplinary hearing might be sufficient in a
liability action, leading to the injustice of finding civilly actionable behavior that
would not subject an attorney to discipline, see 30 Drake L. Rev. 937, 943 (1981); 3)
due to fundamental differences between the "'standard of conduct" applied in a
disciplinary action and that applied in a civil damages action, Code use is misguided,
Dahlquist, supra note 7, at 18, because while some situations clearly require money
damages, others justify sanctions against the attorney, id., and a merger of the two
systems would likely bring about inequitable results; and 4) the overall vagueness of
the CPR precludes it from mandating a standard of civil liability, see id. at 20, and
creates great difficulty in applying its general tenets to a specific situation, Wolfram,
supra note 34, at 294-95.
36. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
37. At the center of the tripartite relationship the insurance attorney must evalu-
ate liability actions in the face of the divergent interests of the carrier and the
insured. See Longo v. American Policyholders' Ins. Co., 181 N.J. Super. 87, 91-92,
436 A.2d 577, 579-80 (Law Div. 1981); Leake, The Role of Defense Counsel Regard-
ing Settlement Demands and Opportunities, 48 Ins. Couns. J. 169, 169 (1981).
1323
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cause a multiplicity of client interests is a fixture of the tripartite
relationship . 3
For example, in Lieberman v. Employers Insurance,39 defense
counsel was found to have committed actionable negligence by set-
tling a medical malpractice action against the insured's desire rather
than withdrawing from representation. 40 The insured had consented
to settlement, 4' but upon learning of possible fraud on the part of the
plaintiff-patient, he attempted to revoke his consent. 42 The insurance
company refused to honor the revocation and so informed defense
counsel. 43 The insurer and defense counsel concluded that defense of
the malpractice claim would be "almost impossible,"' 44 but continued
to prepare for trial. 45 Finally, at a judge-initiated pretrial conference,
the plaintiff offered to settle his $3,000,000 claim for $50,000. Defense
counsel was instructed by the insurer to settle and did so without
consulting the insured. 46
In finding actionable negligence the Supreme Court of New Jersey
held "[t]he attorney's professional dereliction ... consisted of his
failure to inform [the insured] of the clear conflict of interests and his
subsequent failure either to withdraw from the case completely or to
terminate his representation of either the insured or the insurer." 47
This standard may be traced to DR 5-105 (A) and (B). 48
The facts indicate that although in hindsight a conflict may have
existed at the point the insurer dishonored the insured's withdrawal of
consent, a "clear conflict" of interest did not arise until the parties met
in judge's chambers immediately before trial. 49 To require counsel to
withdraw at this time, however, would not only be "most impracti-
38. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
39. 84 N.J. 325, 419 A.2d 417 (1980).
40. Id. at 340, 419 A.2d at 425.
41. Id. at 331, 419 A.2d at 420.
42. Id. at 331-32, 419 A.2d at 420.
43. Id. at 332, 419 A.2d at 420-21.
44. Id. at 331, 419 A.2d at 420.
45. See id. at 333, 419 A.2d at 421. The trial had been scheduled and adjourned
11 times. On the date of settlement defense counsel had put the insured "'on call" for
trial. Id.
46. Id. at 332-33, 419 A.2d at 421.
47. Id. at 340, 419 A.2d at 425. The court also stated that defense counsel's active
participation in settlement against his client's wishes was actionable. Id.
48. See Code, supra note 1, DR 5-105(A) & (B); see also 33 Rutgers L. Rev. 1199,
1210 & n.94 (1981) (recognizing court's language stems from CPR Canon 5).
49. 84 N.J. at 340, 419 A.2d at 425. Defense counsel had explored both settle-
ment and trial possibilities, id. at 333, 419 A.2d at 421, seemingly a prudent course in
light of the insured's earlier indecision over the propriety of settling. Without the
benefit of hindsight, it was not until a reasonable offer was put forth by the plaintiff
immediately preceding trial that defense counsel was put in a position in which the
interests of one client clearly conflicted with the other.
[Vol. 511324
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cal, if not impossible, ' 50 but might also constitute a violation of DR 2-
110,,1 in which the lawyer is admonished not to withdraw until he
takes reasonable steps to avoid prejudice to his client. 52 Lieberman is
noteworthy not so much for its ultimate finding of negligence, but for
the court's reasoning whereby insurance counsel is required either to
withdraw, decline employment or face malpractice liability.
Requiring insurance defense counsel to withdraw at all points of
conflict would effectively put an end to the well-established and
usually effective representation arrangement created by insurance
contracts. 53 DR 5-105(C), in response to this inflexibility, attempts to
prescribe a standard for valid representation of adverse clients. 54 Un-
fortunately, this provision of the Code poses problems to insurance
counsel as significant as those created by the mandatory withdrawal
requirements of DR 5-105(A) and (B).
2. Vagueness
Valid representation of divergent interests under DR 5-105(C) is
predicated on two "nebulous" 55 factors: "full disclosure of the possible
effect of such representation on [the attorney's] independent profes-
sional judgment" and "obvious [ability to] adequately represent the
interest of each [client]." ' 5 The problem with using the "full disclo-
sure" language of DR 5-105(C) as the standard of care is that it gives
the attorney little guidance regarding the nature of the information
50. Haskell, Insurance Defense Lawyers Face Liability Over Conflicts of Inter-
ests, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 25, 1980, at 27, col. 1; see Stanley, A Defense Lawyer's
Dilemma, 14 Forum 693, 697-98 (1981).
51. Code, supra note 1, DR 2-110.
52. Id. DR 2-110(A)(2).
In any event, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he has
taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his
client, including giving due notice to his client, allowing time for employ-
ment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and property to
which the client is entitled, and complying with applicable laws and rules.
Id. The Code, however, also calls for mandatory withdrawal if the attorney "'knows
or it is obvious that his continued employment will result in violation of a Discipli-
nary Rule." Id. DR 2-110(B)(2). In the insurance context this rule is most difficult to
follow because many conflicts and subsequent alternatives do not manifest them-
selves until viewed in hindsight. See R. Mallen & V. Levit, supra note 8, § 162, at 260
(citing insurance cases); 30 Drake L. Rev. 937, 946 (1981).
53. See P. Magarick, supra note 11, at 60; Weithers, supra note 14, at 156. See
supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
54. See Code, supra note 1, DR 5-105(C).
55. ABC Trans Nat'l Transp., Inc. v. Aeronautics Forwarders, Inc., 90 Ill. App.
3d 817, 830, 413 N.E.2d 1299, 1310 (1980).
56. Code, supra note 1, DR 5-105(C). For the full text of DR 5-105(C), see supra
note 33.
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that must be imparted to the insured. 57 This shortcoming is illustrated
by the Illinois decision in Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund
& Belom. 5
In Rogers, pursuant to a valid policy exclusion, consent of the
insured to settlement was unnecessary.5 9 The insurer exercised its
contractual right to settle and its counsel, under the tripartite relation-
ship, negotiated a settlement without informing the insured. 6° The
court used Canon 5 of the CPR to establish a standard of care, holding
that the failure to disclose was itself a sufficient basis for professional
negligence. 6' On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged
the defense contention that the lower court had used "a violation of
the canons or disciplinary rules of the [Code to establish] a per se basis
for imposing liability on an attorney in a malpractice action,"6 2 but
nevertheless sidestepped the issue, and affirmed the finding of negli-
gence solely on the failure to disclose. 63
In agreeing that the attorney had failed to satisfy the general disclo-
sure requirements embodied in DR 5-105, the court provided no
specific guidance as to what a lawyer is required to disclose.64 Argua-
bly, the court would not have found negligence if counsel had in-
formed the insured that the carrier intended to exercise its contractual
right to settle,65 a meaningless gesture given the contractual settlement
provisions. The "thin line between malpractice and professional re-
sponsibility" 66 becomes an absurdity when liability may be predicated
on the failure to carry out a meaningless ritual. Assuming that more
than a meaningless gesture is required, insurance defense counsel is
still in a quandary because Rogers left open the question of exactly
what and how much disclosure is required.6 7
57. Fordham, There are Substantial Limitations on Representation of Clients in
Litigation Which are not Obvious in the Code of Professional Responsibility, 33 Bus.
Law. 1193, 1205 (1978); Conflicts of Interest, supra note 8, at 1312 n. 137; see Moritz
v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. 865, 871-72 (W.D. Wis. 1977); Underwood,
supra note 8, at 389.
58. 74 Ill. App. 3d 467, 392 N.E.2d 1365 (1979), aff'd, 81 Ill. 2d 201,407 N.E.2d
47 (1980).
59. Id. at 470, 392 N.E.2d at 1369.
60. Id. at 469, 392 N.E.2d at 1368.
61. Id. at 472-74, 392 N.E.2d at 1371-72.
62. Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 81 111. 2d 201, 204,
407 N.E.2d 47, 48 (1980).
63. Id. at 205-06, 407 N.E.2d at 49.
64. Id.; 30 De Paul L. Rev. 499, 518 (1981); 69 III. B.J. 508, 510 (1981); see 30
Drake L. Rev. 937, 947 (1981).
65. See Dondanville, supra note 25, at 65.
66. Haskell, supra note 50, at 27, col. 1 (referring specifically to insurance
defense practice).
67. Rogers also failed to address a fundamental problem raised by applying Code
restraints to the tripartite relationship: If the attorney assigned by the carrier cannot
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In fact, courts have differed widely in their interpretation of the
amount and type of disclosure necessary. 68 The danger arises that if a
court does not feel disclosure was adequate based upon the Code, it
may find the attorney negligent per se, even though that attorney
based his disclosure on accepted insurance practice. 69 In recognition of
defense counsel's dual set of responsibilities, the adequacy of disclo-
sure should be interpreted with a degree of reasonableness in light of
the specific circumstance.
The other language of DR 5-105(C)-"obvious that he can ade-
quately represent" 70 -is also too vague to serve as a standard of civil
ethically settle, who car)? See R. Mallen & V. Levit, supra note 8, § 539, at 663 n.14.
It appears that no appointed counsel may receive valid settlement authority due to
the ethical straightjacket imposed by the CPR. If the insured is deemed to have the
last word on settlement, Code use would then effectively rewrite contractual provi-
sions regarding control of the defense. See Guy, supra note 24, at 14; 30 De Paul L.
Rev. 499, 518 (1981). If the insurer is permitted to settle, the court merely will have
drawn a distinction without a difference between the attorney and insurance carrier,
except that settlement by counsel would be tantamount to malpractice, while the
very same settlement by the insurer would be acknowledged as sound insurance
practice.
68. Compare In re Lanza, 65 N.J. 347, 352-53, 322 A.2d 445, 448 (1974) (hold-
ing that disclosure is a question for the attorney in light of the circumstances) with
McAlinden v. Wiggins, 543 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (requiring attorney
to disclose potential ramifications of joint representation) and Jedwabny v. Philadel-
phia Transp. Co., 390 Pa. 231, 235, 135 A.2d 252, 254 (1957) (defining disclosure as
requiring explanation of the possible adverse effect on representation), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 966 (1958) and Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers, 64 Ill. 2d 187, 198, 355
N.E.2d 24, 31 (1976) (requiring attorney to disclose existence of conflict) and Fulton
v. Woodford, 26 Ariz. App. 17, 20, 545 P.2d 979, 982 (1976) (same) and Lysick v.
Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 147, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 414 (1968) (requiring
attorney to disclose all facts so that the client can make an intelligent decision
regarding the adequacy of representation) and In re Farr, 264 Ind. 153, 167, 340
N.E.2d 777, 785 (1976) (same). See generally Annotated Code, supra note 29, at 243-
44 (discussing difficulty in ascertaining "full disclosure").
69. Under the CPR an attorney must disclose "the possible effect of such repre-
sentation on the exercise of his independent professional judgment." Code, supra
note 1, DR 5-105(C). Therefore, if defense counsel does not disclose a conflict's effect
on the exercise of his independent professional judgment to the satisfaction of the
court, liability may be found. It was recently noted in an analysis of DR 5-105 that
"beyond these general guidelines, it remains unclear precisely what full disclosure
entails." Conflicts of Interest, supra note 8, at 1312 n.137. This problem is com-
pounded because different courts implement different disclosure standards. See supra
note 68. The drafters of the Model Rules have abandoned the term "disclosure," 1981
Model Rules, supra note 5, Rule 1.7, and now require "consultation," Model Rules,
supra note 4, Rule 1.7. The Model Rules further require that consultation include
"explanation of the implications of the common representation and the advantages
and risks involved." Id. Rule 1.7(b)(2). One commentator has suggested that the
Model Rules standard is superior to that of the CPR. Dondanville, supra note 25, at
67.
70. Code, supra note 1, DR 5-105(C). See supra note 33, for full text.
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liability. 7' As noted recently in one study, "[tihe Code does not indi-
cate how clear a conflict must be in order for representation to be
inadequate. ' 72 Nor does it give any indication of when it becomes
"obvious" that one can represent a client under a conflict situation. 73
Code language alone, therefore, cannot stand as a liability standard,
but rather "necessitate[s] explanation and expert testimony"7 4 both of
which would be lost if DR 5-105(C) established negligence per se.75
Even if counsel satisfies all the appropriate ethical requirements, he
still may not be assured that his continued representation of dual
interests will be permissible. Some courts have found attorney disclo-
sure and client consent inapposite to conflict situations.7 6 If such a
court finds even "the potential for irreconcilable conflict" 77 it may
hold the insured's consent invalid.7 8 Because the potential for conflict
is an inherent feature of the tripartite relationship, the insurance
defense lawyer can never be confident that a client's consent will be
held valid. In sum, the standard in DR 5-105(C) is too vague and the
consequences of its use too uncertain to serve as a standard for impos-
ing civil liability.
3. Code as a Weapon
Use of the Code to impose malpractice liability enables plaintiffs
counsel to create and use conflict situations to his advantage. 79 Plain-
71. See Dondanville, supra note 25, at 66-67; Fordham, supra note 57, at 1204-
05; Underwood, supra note 8, at 388-89; Conflicts of Interest, supra note 8, at 1304-
05.
72. Conflicts of Interest, supra note 8, at 1304 (footnote omitted).
73. Fordham, supra note 57, at 1204 ("Whether 'it is obvious'-so that you can
[adequately represent each client] with consent after full disclosure-is an interesting
question. It is fair to say that what is and is not 'obvious' within the meaning of DR 5-
105(C) is not obvious. Nor is there an), guidance in the case law.").
74. Dahlquist, supra note 7, at 25.
75. 69 Ill. B.J. 508, 510 n.16 (1981). If ethical rules were used to create a
standard of negligence per se, courts would not have to look any further than the
rules themselves to find actionable conduct. See Comment, Violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility as Stating a Cause of Action in Legal Malpractice, 6 Ohio
N.U.L. Rev. 692, 699 (1979).
76. See Valley Title Co. v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. App. 3d 867, 882, 177 Cal.
Rptr. 643, 651-52 (1981); Klemm v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 898, 142
Cal. Rptr. 509, 512 (1977); Greene v. Greene, 47 N.Y.2d 447, 451-52, 391 N.E.2d
1355, 1357-58, 418 N.Y.S.2d 379, 381-82 (1979); Kelly v. Greason, 23 N.Y.2d 368,
378, 244 N.E.2d 456, 462, 296 N.Y.S.2d 937, 945-46 (1968). But see Arcon Constr.
Co. v. State Dep't of Transp., 314 N.W.2d 303, 307 (S.D. 1982) (consent held valid).
77. Greene v. Greene, 47 N.Y.2d 447, 451, 391 N.E.2d 1355, 1358, 418 N.Y.S.2d
379, 381-82 (1979).
78. Id. See supra note 76.
79. Lindgren, Toward a New Standard of Attorney Disqualification, 1982 A.B.
Found. Res. J. 419, 434-35; Underwood, supra note 8, at 386; cf. Smiley v. Manches-
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tiff must simply offer settlement below policy limits but in excess of a
normally acceptable value to the carrier. 0 If defense counsel rejects
settlement and proceeds to trial he risks an excess judgment and
subsequent malpractice liability for failing to represent the insured's
best interests. In the event of an excess judgment, the insured may be
permitted to assign to the plaintiff, in return for a covenant not to sue,
any cause of action he might have against defense counsel arising out
of the liability suit."' For this reason, it was recently recognized that
"plaintiff's counsel [will] exploit such conflicts to obtain settlement
leverage or an additional 'deep pocket,' the unwary defense coun-
sel." 81
If, on the other hand, defense counsel pushes for settlement just
within policy limits for the sole benefit of the insured, he risks the loss
of future employment by the insurer. 83 As one commentator stated:
Defense counsel who become too independent and cause unnec-
essary problems for the carrier in their zeal to protect rights of the
ter Ins. & Indem. Co., 71 11. 2d 306, 308, 375 N.E.2d 118, 119 (1978) (plaintiffs
attorney sought to establish "bad faith" on part of insurance company at pretrial
negotiations so that in event of excess judgment, damages would be collectible
against the carrier).
80. See R. Mallen & V. Levit, supra note 8, § 528, at 637 (defense counsel
liability increasing because of plaintiffs counsel's use of structured settlement de-
mands); cf. Lindgren, supra note 79, at 434-35 (discussing tactic of offering different
settlements to co-defendants). Insurance company adjusters regularly arrive at ac-
ceptable monetary values for plaintiff's damages. H.L. Ross, Settled Out of Court
106-16 (1980).
81. 20B J. Appelman, Insurance Law and Practice § 11,771, at 72-74 (1980); see
Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 144, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 412 (1968). The
assignability of excess judgment actions against the insurer by the insured to the
plaintiff is generally accepted. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 412 F.2d 475,
484-85 (5th Cir. 1969); Smiley v. Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co., 13 111. App. 3d 809,
813, 301 N.E.2d 19, 22 (1973). Courts disagree, however, whether a cause of action
for legal malpractice may be assigned. R. Mallen & V. Levit, supra note 8, § 76.
Compare Collins v. Fitzwater, 277 Or. 401, 407-09, 560 P.2d 1074, 1078 (1977)
(assignable) with Christison v. Jones, 83 Ill. App. 3d 334, 339, 405 N.E.2d 8, 11
(1980) (not assignable). Even if a claim were not assignable, the defense attorney
would not be immune from an action brought by the insurer for mishandling the
liability suit. R. Mallen & V. Levit, supra note 8, § 527, at 633-35; Keeton, supra
note 10, at 1173; see Smiley v. Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co., 71 Ill. 2d 306, 307,
375 N.E.2d 118, 119 (1978).
82. Underwood, supra note 8, at 386.
83. Joint Program of Defense Research Committee and Defense Research Insti-
tute: "Whose Case Is It Anyway?", 49 Ins. Couns. J. 445, 455 (1982) (remarks of Mr.
Wendorff) [hereinafter cited as Joint Program]; see Schwartz v. Sar Corp., 19 Misc.
2d 660, 666, 195 N.Y.S.2d 496, 503 (Sup. Ct.) (recognizing the natural tie of the
insurance counsel to the carrier), rev'd on other grounds, 9 A.D.2d 910, 195
N.Y.S.2d 819 (1959); 30 Drake L. Rev. 937, 947 (1981) (addressing the reality of
defense counsel's dependence on insurance company as major source of income).
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insured because of an actual or perceived conflict of interest be-
tween the insured and the carrier run the risk of being removed
from the carrier's roster of defense counsel. 84
From the plaintiffs view, the opportunity is great for a substantial
recovery without the burden of going to trial.
In either case, plaintiff's counsel has strong incentive to create and
exploit conflict situations. This result certainly was not intended by
the drafters of the CPR who created the Code as an "incentive for the
highest possible degree of ethical conduct," 85 and not as a means for
decimating the insurance bar.
The CPR does not lend itself to use in insurance counsel malpractice
litigation as it was neither designed for, nor is it capable of factoring
in, the realities of insurance defense practice. 86 There must be room
for discretion when judging the insurance defense lawyer because the
per se limitations found in the Code are "wooden and arbitrary," and
therefore not applicable to insurance counsel's unique conflicts. 87
B. Effects of a Singular Loyalty Standard
The CPR is a codification of common-law fiduciary obligations,88
and malpractice claims against insurance defense lawyers have been
phrased, not only as CPR violations, but as failures of counsel to fulfill
their fiduciary obligation of undivided loyalty. 9 Courts that construe
a violation of the CPR or this fiduciary duty as actionable malpractice
impose a standard of singular loyalty upon defense counsel. In the
typical attorney-client relationship, violation of the duty of undivided
loyalty should be actionable.9 0 In the insurance defense setting, how-
ever, a duty of strict undivided loyalty is unworkable.9"
84. Joint Program, supra note 83, at 455 (remarks of Mr. Wendorff).
85. Code, supra note 1, Preamble.
86. See D. Meiselman, supra note 20, § 19:5, at 296; see also Code, supra note 1,
Preamble (the Code does not address all situations an attorney may encounter). See
supra notes 9-22 and accompanying text (discussing problems inherent in insurance
defense work that distinguish insurance counsel from ordinary attorney).
87. See Conflicts of Interest, supra note 8, at 1269 (referring to per se prohibi-
tions on counsel's independent "professional judgment").
88. See R. Mallen & V. Levit, supra note 8, § 122, at 213; Conflicts of Interest,
supra note 8, at 1312.
89. R. Mallen & V. Levit, supra note 8, § 521, at 619-20; see Lieberman v.
Employers Ins., 84 N.J. 325, 334, 419 A.2d 417, 421-22 (1980); cf. Weiner v.
Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp, 114 Cal. App. 3d 39, 43-44, 170 Cal. Rptr. 533, 535
(1980) (litigating against former client); Apple v. Hall, 412 N.E.2d 114, 116 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1980) (representation of adverse clients).
90. See, e.g., Christison v. Jones, 83 I1. App. 3d 334, 338, 405 N.E.2d 8, 10-11(1980); Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). See generally
R. Mallen & V. Levit, supra note 8, §§ 121-133 (general discussion of fiduciary
obligations).
91. See infra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
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Concededly, upon initial examination a standard of singular loyalty
to the insured appears ideal because it seemingly eliminates the dilem-
mas created by the representation of dual interests.9 2 Unfortunately,
this standard raises more problems than it solves. Even when it is not
the named defendant in a liability suit, the carrier retains a strong
direct financial interest in the litigation. 93 To protect its interests, the
insurance company would be forced to employ a second set of counsel
in all real and potential conflict situations. The resulting increase in
legal fees, coupled with the fact that "[i]f [the] insured controlled the
settlement decision, self-interest would induce him to make higher
settlements, ' 94 would send the cost of insurance coverage skyrocket-
ing.9 5 Strong public policy militates against any doctrine that would
ultimately result in prohibitively high insurance premiums.
96
A singular loyalty standard would also upset the traditional and
developed contractual relationships between the interested parties.
97
Defense counsel would be placed in the unenviable position of oppos-
ing the company that hired him. Given the realities of insurance
practice and human nature, many of the conflicts found under a dual
representation system would therefore still exist. 98
92. Morris, supra note 10, at 465 (proposing standard of singular loyalty as
solution to conflicts faced by defense counsel); see Jackson v. Trapier, 42 Misc. 2d
139, 140, 247 N.Y.S.2d 315, 316 (Sup. Ct. 1964) ("[T]he [insured] is the client and
not the insurance carrier."); Employers Casualty Co. v. Tilley, 496 S.W.2d 552, 563
(Tex. 1973) (Johnson, J., concurring) ("The representation provided by the attorney
more appropriately should be construed as representation of a single client, [the
insured]."); 52 Tex. L. Rev. 610, 619 (1974) ("To characterize the attorney as
representative of one client rather than two would preserve the high ethical obliga-
tions between attorney and insured while eliminating the dilemma caused by [con-
flicts].").
93. Fager, supra note 23, at 160.
94. Keeton, supra note 10, at 1166.
95. Id. at 1165-66.
96. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keller, 17 Ill. App. 2d 44, 49, 149 N.E.2d 482, 484
(1958), overruled on other grounds, M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 34 Ill. App. 3d
209, 219, 340 N.E.2d 331, 338 (1975), aff'd, 66 I11. 2d 492, 363 N.E.2d 809 (1977);
see 19 J. Appleman, supra note 81, § 10,501, at 473 (1982); R. Keeton, supra note 11,
§ 8.4(a), at 559: Kesner, Auto Insurance Rating: A Question of Equal Protection, 32
Fed. Ins. Couns. Q. 165, 165 (1982); An Insurer's Failure, supra note 17, at 456.
97. The relationship among the insurer, insured and attorney arises as the result
of a "hardboiled commercial transaction"-the insurance contract. Moritz v. Medi-
cal Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. 865, 872 (W.D. Wis. 1977) (addressing relationship
between insurer and insured); see R. Mallen & V. Levit, supra note 8, § 522, at 621
(addressing relationship between insurer and attorney).
98. It has been recognized that counsel hired by the insurance company has very
strong ties to the carrier. Schwartz v. Sar Corp., 19 Misc. 2d 660, 666, 195 N.Y.S.2d
496, 503 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 9 A.D.2d 910, 195 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1959);
30 Drake L. Rev. 937, 947 (1981). Consequently, it may be unreasonable to expect
that a standard of singular loyalty would allow counsel to disregard totally the
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Under the tripartite relationship, the insurer, due to its primary
financial interest in the defense, 99 has a strong motive to assign the
most qualified counsel available to the insured. Under a singular
loyalty standard, however, this incentive might be removed because
the carrier would wish to retain the finest counsel for its own interests
and would assign less adept counsel to represent the insured in order
to gain the upper hand in negotiations. Alternatively, if the insured
were given the option to choose his own counsel, higher premiums
would result. 00 Moreover, giving the insured, who has little knowl-
edge of the insurance bar, the right to select his defense lawyer could
lead to the employment of counsel inexperienced in insurance law.'0 '
Policyholder control over settlement would also set the stage for a
reversal of the current excess liability situation. 102 The insurer is pres-
ently held to a good faith standard in its decision to go to trial in lieu
of settling. 0 3 If the insured is given settlement discretion he should
similarly be held to a good faith standard, and the insurer should be
given a remedy in the event of a capricious settlement. 4 Without any
penalty for bad faith settlement, the insured would have little reason
to litigate even spurious claims. Accordingly, it is best to leave insur-
ance litigation in the hands of those best able to handle it-the insur-
ance company and defense counsel well trained in insurance law.
II. ADVANTAGES OF A PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE STANDARD
Because dual representation is a necessary evil in insurance litiga-
tion, the standard of care to which an attorney should be held in this
extraordinary situation must account for the inherent conflicts such
counsel face. In light of this requirement, the traditional malpractice
interests of the insurer. See Hamilton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 9 Wash.
App. 180, 185-86, 511 P.2d 1020, 1023-24 (1973), aff'd, 83 Wash. 2d 787, 523 P.2d
193 (1974); D. Meiselman, supra note 20, § 19.5, at 296.
99. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
100. See Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. 865, 872 (W.D. Wis.
1977) (recognizing that the right to choose counsel is a factor in the price of insur-
ance); cf. Keeton, supra note 10, at 1165 (giving insured the right to settle would
result in higher insurance cost).
101. Commentators have acknowledged that insurance defense counsel plays a
specialized role in litigation. Weithers, supra note 14, at 156 (unique role); Morris,
supra note 10, at 463 (specialist). See infra note 130 and accompanying text. Accord-
ingly, employment of counsel inexperienced in the field would result in an overall
lower quality of legal care.
102. See Keeton, supra note 10, at 1163-65; Insured's Bad Faith, supra note 18, at
878.
103. P. Magarick, supra note 12, § 10.03. See supra note 18.
104. See Keeton, supra note 10, at 1165; Insured's Bad Faith, supra note 18, at
878-79.
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standard of professional negligence is the sole measure by which insur-
ance counsel should be evaluated.
Traditionally, professional malpractice liability has been based
upon the plaintiff's proving the same four basic elements as in other
negligence actions: duty, breach of duty, proximate cause and dam-
age.105 In the insurance setting, a duty is established when defense
counsel enters the tripartite relationship.10 6 The issues of breach of
duty, proximate cause and damages are generally reserved as ques-
tions of fact. 0 7 The standard of care required of the defendant is a
question of law. 0 8
Although an all-encompassing definition of the standard of care
owed by counsel has not and cannot be established for all circum-
stances, 0 9 it is commonly held that "the attorney should exercise the
skill and knowledge ordinarily possessed by attorneys under similar
circumstances.""0 Whether a defendant has failed to satisfy the stan-
dard of care, a jury question,' is "the heart of the negligence
105. D. Meiselman, supra note 20, § 8:2, at 120; see Savings Bank v. Ward, 100
U.S. 195, 198-99 (1879); Malloy v. Sullivan, 415 So. 2d 1059, 1060 (Ala.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 308 (1982); Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 523, 50
Cal. Rptr. 592, 593 (1966); Hutchinson v. Smith, 417 So. 2d 926, 927-28 (Miss.
1982); Mendoza v. Schlossman, 87 A.D.2d 606, 607, 448 N.Y.S.2d 45, 46 (1982) (per
curiam); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328A (1965) (general negligence
action).
106. See American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 579,
590-91, 113 Cal. Rptr. 561, 570-71 (1974); Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Bru-
mund & Belom, 74 Ill. App. 3d 467, 472, 392 N.E.2d 1365, 1370-71 (1979), af'd, 81
Ill. 2d 201, 407 N.E.2d 47 (1980); Lieberman v. Employers Ins., 84 N.J. 325, 338,
419 A.2d 417, 424 (1980).
107. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328C(b)-(d) (1965); see Lieberman v. Em-
ployers Ins., 84 N.J. 325, 342, 419 A.2d 417, 426 (1980) (proximate cause and
damages); Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 150-56, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 416-
18 (1968) (breach and proximate cause).
108. Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 525, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595
(1966); W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 37, at 206 (4th ed. 1971); Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 328B(c) (1965).
109. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328C comment b (1965).
110. R. Mallen & V. Levit, supra note 8, § 251, at 318 (footnote omitted) (empha-
sis in original); see I N.Y. Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil 2d 2:152 (2d ed. 1974).
An attorney who undertakes to represent a client impliedly represents that
he possesses a reasonable degree of skill, that he is familiar with the rules
regulating practice in actions of the type which he undertakes to bring and
with such principles of law in relation to such actions as are well-settled in
the practice of law in the locality where he practices, and that he will
exercise reasonable care. Reasonable care means that degree of care that the
average attorney in good standing practicing in the locality where he prac-
tices would exercise under the same circumstances.
Id. (emphasis added).
111. Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 525-26, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595
(1966); Sheets v. Letnes, Marshall & Fiedler, Ltd., 311 N.W.2d 175, 180 (N.D.
1981); see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328C(b) (1965).
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action;"" 12 it forms the basis for attorney liability in a malpractice
suit."13
Juries may generally consider seven distinct factors "4 in determin-
ing whether the standard of care has been violated: custom," 5 special-
ization," 6 local considerations, 1 7 ethical considerations,""8 time of the
application of the standard, 1 9 gross negligence 120 and good faith. 21 -
The court instructs the jury as to the general standard of care expected
of the attorney, 22 and the jury considers these individual factors in
view of the particular evidence 23 to arrive at a "particular standard
112. Green, The Submission of Issues in Negligence Cases, 18 U. Miami L. Rev.
30, 37 (1963).
113. Note, Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice, 43 Ind. L.J. 771, 772 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Standard of Care]; see Dahlquist, supra note 7, at 8; Houser,
Legal Malpractice-An Overview, 55 N.D.L. Rev. 185, 195 (1979).
114. See generally R. Mallen & V. Levit, supra note 8, §§ 253-259 (discussing each
factor).
115. See infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
117. Consideration of locality are often cited by courts as factors in establishing
the standard of care. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Smith, 417 So. 2d 926, 928 (Miss.
1982); Sheets v. Letnes, Marshall & Fiedler, Ltd., 311 N.W.2d 175, 180 (N.D.1981).
In State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Oxford, 127 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1960) (per curiam), an
attorney escaped disbarment by showing that representation of both husband and
wife in a divorce proceeding was common practice in the locality. Id. at 112. In an
action against defense counsel, however, evidence of practice within the insurance
industry would be more helpful in evaluating attorney conduct than evidence of
practice within a locality because the question of locality would be encompassed by
evidence of specialization. See R. Mallen & V. Levit, supra note 8, § 254, at 332.
118. Ethical considerations are composed of generic rules that are not specifically
applicable to the unique tripartite relationship. See R. Mallen & V. Levit, supra note
8, § 256, at 341. Because of the probative value of Code violations, such evidence
may be highly prejudicial to the defense attorney. See Conflicts of Interest, supra
note 8, at 1490.
119. Generally, an attorney is not liable for conduct that was reasonable in light
of the state of the law at the time of his actions, although in hindsight such conduct
may prove to have been in error. O'Brien v. Nobel, 106 Ill. App. 3d 126, 130, 435
N.E.2d 554, 557 (1982); e.g., Smith v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 366 F. Supp.
1283, 1290 (M.D. La. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 500 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1974); Smith
v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 356, 530 P.2d 589, 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621, 625 (1975),
overruled on other grounds, In re Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 851 n.14, 544 P.2d 561,
569 n.14, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641 n.14 (1976).
120. The relevance of this factor in establishing a standard of care has diminished.
See R. Mallen & V. Levit, supra note 8, § 258.
121. Generally a duty of good faith inheres in the attorney client relationship. D.
Meiselman, supra note 20, § 1:4. This issue, however, is not of great importance in
establishing attorney liability for malpractice. See R. Mallen & V. Levit, supra note
8, § 257.
122. See W. Prosser, supra note 108, § 37, at 206; Restatement (Second) of Torts §
328B(c) (1965).
123. W. Prosser, supra note 108, § 37, at 207; Restatement (Second) of Torts §
328C comment b (1965); Standard of Care, supra note 113, at 775-76.
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of conduct" 24 and determines whether it has been met. Many juris-
dictions also require expert testimony to aid in that determination.1
25
Among the seven factors jurors may consider, custom and speciali-
zation are the most significant. Consideration of customary profes-
sional practice is important in legal malpractice litigation because it
guards against the "potentially destructive propensities of any
* . .criteria [that do] not reflect the peculiar needs of the [attorney-
client relationship]." 28 Evidence of custom is highly probative of the
reasonableness of attorney conduct in any precise circumstance,12 7 and
therefore, is indispensable when judging the conduct of the insurance
attorney. A professional negligence analysis would include documen-
tation of customary insurance defense practices such as dual represen-
tation and permit a fact-specific assessment of the propriety of coun-
sel's conduct.
Also relevant under a professional negligence approach would be
evidence of specialization. 2 8 Although no jurisdiction has certified the
insurance bar as specialists,I2 9 insurance practice is similar to those
124. W. Prosser, supra note 108, § 37, at 207; Restatement (Second) of Torts §
328C comment b (1965).
125. E.g., Lentino v. Fringe Employee Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 474, 480 & n.8 (3d
Cir. 1979); Hill Aircraft & Leasing Corp. v. Tyler, 161 Ga. App. 267, 271-72, 291
S.E.2d 6, 11 (1982); DiPiero v. Goodman, 436 N.E.2d 998, 999 (Mass. App. Ct.
1982); Dean v. Conn., 419 So. 2d 148, 150-51 (Miss. 1982). Courts have recognized
that a jury may not be able to apply negligence principles properly without the aid of
expert testimony. Gibson v. Talley, 291 S.E.2d 72, 75 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (quoting
Berman v. Rubin, 138 Ga. App. 849, 853-54, 227 S.E.2d 802, 806 (1976)); Hughes v.
Malone, 146 Ga. App. 341, 345, 247 S.E.2d 107, 111 (1978).
126. Standard of Care, supra note 113, at 773.
127. See Hill Aircraft & Leasing Corp. v. Tyler, 161 Ga. App. 267, 273, 291
S.E.2d 6, 11 (1982); DiPiero v. Goodman, 436 N.E.2d 998, 999 (Mass. App. Ct.
1982) (same) (quoting Glidden v. Terranova, 427 N.E.2d 1169, 1170 (Mass. App. Ct.
1981)); St. Pius X House of Retreats v. Diocese of Camden, 88 N.J. 571, 588, 443
A.2d 1052, 1061 (1982); W. Prosser, supra note 108, § 33, at 166; Standard of Care,
supra note 113, at 773, 778.
128. R. Mallen & V. Levit, supra note 8, § 253, at 328; see Wright v. Williams, 47
Cal. App. 3d 802, 810, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 (1975); Rodriguez v. Horton, 95
N.M. 356, 359, 622 P.2d 261, 264 (Ct. App. 1980); Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63
Colum. L. Rev. 1292, 1302-04 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Attorney Malpractice]. See
generally Schnidman & Salzler, The Legal Malpractice Dilemma: Will New Stan-
dards of Care Place Professional Liability Insurance Beyond the Reach of the Special-
ist?, 45 U. Cin. L. Rev. 541 (1976) (effect of specialization on the standard of care);
Comment, Specialization: The Resulting Standard of Care and Duty to Consult, 30
Baylor L. Rev. 729 (1978) (same) [hereinafter cited as Specialization: The Resulting
Standard].
129. R. Mallen & V. Levit, supra note 8, § 523, at 623-24. Because specialist
certification is designed to aid the general public in choosing counsel, Wells, Certifi-
cation in Texas: Increasing Lawyer Competence and Aiding the Public in Lawyer
Selection, 30 Baylor L. Rev. 689, 690-91 (1978), and insurance attorneys are usually
selected by carriers, American Home Assurance Co. v. Weissman, 79 A.D.2d 923,
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that are granted such status. 30 Specialization has been recognized in
those fields in which attorneys through active practice have gained a
"special competence" 13' in a discrete area of the law.' 32 Generally, the
recognized specialist is held to a higher standard of care than the
ordinary lawyer' 33 because the specialist must exercise a degree of skill
and care commensurate with practice in that specialty.13 4 Although
considerations of specialization may hold defense counsel to a higher
level of competence, this factor will also serve to protect the attorney
by ensuring evaluation by standards appropriate to his particular
practice.' 35 Such considerations are imperative because principles de-
signed to govern the typical attorney-client relationship are not neces-
sarily adequate to appraise proper conduct under the atypical tripar-
tite arrangement.
Cognizant of the inherent conflicts created by the tripartite rela-
tionship, the American Bar Association (ABA), in conjunction with
the major liability insurers, adopted the Guiding Principles of the
National Conference of Lawyers and Liability Insurers (Guiding Prin-
ciples): 136 ten short rules that directly address problems encountered
by defense counsel.' 37 As such, the Guiding Principles would consti-
924-25, 434 N.Y.S.2d 410, 412 (1981); see 7C J. Appleman, supra note 75, § 4681, at
2 (1979), the defense bar may be slow in receiving specialization certification.
130. See R. Mallen & V. Levit, supra note 8, § 260, at 350 (1st ed. 1977); Morris,
supra note 10, at 463.
131. Wells, supra note 129, at 700.
132. Standard of Care, supra note 113, at 786; see D. Meiselman, supra note 20, §
2:10, at 24; cf. Wells, supra note 129, at 691 (labor law).
133. Hagglund & Birnbaum, Legal Specialization: The Need for Uniformity, 32
Fed. Ins. Couns. Q. 301, 309-10 (1982); see D. Meiselman, supra note 20, § 2:10, at
25; Schnidman & Salzler, supra note 128, at 548; Specialization: The Resulting
Standard, supra note 128, at 733-37; see also Attorney Malpractice, supra note 128,
at 1302-04 (arguing that there should be a higher standard).
134. Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 810, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199
(1975); Rodriguez v. Horton, 95 N.M. 356, 359, 622 P.2d 261, 264 (Ct. App. 1980);
R. Mallen & V. Levitt, supra note 8, § 253, at 325.
135. See Standard of Care, supra note 113, at 785; cf. Morrison v. MacNamara,
407 A.2d 555, 562 (D.C. 1979) (traditionally "locality rule" was designed to protect
doctors by holding them to the proper standard of care); McCoid, The Care Re-
quired of Medical Practitioners, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 549, 607 (1959) (a professional
standard will afford a doctor more protection than a general standard).
136. National Conference of Lawyers and Liability Insurers, Guiding Principles
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Guiding Principles], reprinted in 20 Fed. Ins. Couns. Q.,
Summer 1970, at 95 and in Weithers, supra note 14, at 158. The Guiding Principles
were adopted by the ABA on February 7, 1972. Id. These principles, however, were
rescinded by the ABA in August 1980. Summary of Action of the House of Delegates,
A.B.A. Ann. Meeting 23 (Aug. 5-6, 1980). The decision to rescind was based upon a
general trend at the time and not upon the substance of the Guiding Principles.
Underwood, supra note 8, at 389 n.31.
137. Guiding Principles, supra note 136; see, e.g., id. II ("Claim or Suit in
Excess of Limits"); id. III ("Settlement Negotiations in Claims or Suits with Excess
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tute a helpful tool for assessing the conduct of insurance defense
counsel. Unlike the general tenets of the CPR, 138 these insurance-
specific guidelines reflect the troublesome position counsel occupies
and attempt to define better the duties owed by each member of the
tripartite relationship. 3 9 These rules, however, cannot and do not
seek to resolve all conceivable insurance difficulties. 140 Consequently,
the Guiding Principles are not a substitute for the traditional elements
considered in the formation of a standard of care, but may serve as a
useful aide to the jury in evaluating custom and proper conduct by
insurance defense counsel.
Finally, expert testimony should be admitted in a suit against the
insurance defense attorney because the inherent conflicts common to
insurance practice necessitate explanation by qualified witnesses .141
One court has noted that "[u]nless the conflict is so clear as to be
undisputed, expert testimony is generally necessary to prove lawyer
malpractice."' 42 If a CPR violation were to establish negligence per
se, however, this evidence would be excluded.14 3 Moreover, even if
Code provisions were used not as the standard of care itself, but rather
as evidence thereof, expert testimony would still be necessary because
"the Code is subject to varying interpretations, some of which a jury
would not understand without clarif[ication]."1 44
The fundamental advantage of a professional negligence standard
in legal malpractice actions is that it permits consideration of all
relevant factors bearing on counsel's conduct. When addressing such
unique or different fact patterns as those raised by insurance defense,
a standard that allows such consideration is of crucial importance.
CONCLUSION
If the CPR has a place in malpractice litigation, it must be merely
as some evidence of the standard of care-not as the standard itself. In
Exposure"); id. IV ("Conflicts of Interest Generally-Duties of Attorney"); id. V
("Continuation by Attorney Even Though There is a Conflict of Interest").
138. See Code, supra note 1, Canon 5. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying
text.
139. See Guiding Principles, supra note 136, I-X.
140. See 20 Fed. Ins. Couns. Q., Summer 1970, at 93-94. For example, if the
parties do not feel a common defense is warranted they are simply admonished to
"seek other procedures to resolve" their differences. Guiding Principles, supra note
136, V.
141. 69 Ill. B.J. 508, 510 & n.16 (1981); see ABC Trans. Nat'l Transp., Inc. v.
Aeronautics Forwarders, Inc., 90 III. App. 3d 817, 831, 413 N.E.2d 1299, 1311
(1980); Hill v. Okay Constr. Co., 312 Minn. 324, 337, 252 N.W.2d 107, 116 (1977).
142. ABC Trans. Nat'l Transp., Inc. v. Aeronautics Forwarders, Inc., 90 Ill. App.
3d 817, 831, 413 N.E.2d 1299, 1311 (1980).
143. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
144. 69 Ill. B.J. 508, 510 n.16 (1981); see Wolfram, supra note 34, at 294-95.
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an action against defense counsel, any purpose served by the CPR is
better served by the Guiding Principles. If courts are compelled to
apply the CPR to malpractice litigation, it should be only as one of
several factors and with a recognition that the Code was not designed
as a standard for imposing civil liability. To allow the CPR to serve
alone as a standard of care would eliminate consideration of all other
crucially important factors in evaluating defense counsel, including
custom, specialization and expert testimony. Used alone, the Code
becomes a weapon rather than a beneficial tool; it is too vague and
inflexible to serve as the proper standard for assessing the insurance
attorney. Only by applying the adaptable, well-understood principles
of professional negligence can the intricacies of the tripartite relation-
ship be factored into a viable standard for the just appraisal of insur-
ance defense counsel.
Douglas L. Getter
